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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA MAUGHAN 
JEPPSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SAYLOR JEPPSON, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10452 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal concerns the custody and visita-
tion privileges of the parties, with respect to their 
children. 
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT 
The trial court, pursuant to petition of the de-
fendant, after hearing evidence and interviewing 
the oldest child, modified the provisions of its prior 
decree with respect to custody and visiting privi-
leges of the parties. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant requests this court to affirm the modi-
fied Decree entered July 27, 1965, from which ap-
peal was taken. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The chronology of events as set forth in tht· 
Appellant's Brief, except as supplemented or modi-
fied in the argument, is accepted by the Respondent. 
Because the two points raised by Appellant are 
closely interrelated, both will be answered by Re-
spondent in the same argument to avoid needless 
repetition. 
The record of the Court will be cited as R., 
the transcript of the hearing held June 29, 1965, 
which is not separately numbered, will be cited T. 
The transcript of the hearing held July 28, 1964 
and August 4, 1964, will be cited T. 1964. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETER-
MINING THERE HAD BEEN A CHANGE OF CIR-
CUMSTANCES SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A MODI-
FICATION OF THE CHILD CUSTODY PORTION OF 
THE DECREE, WHICH MODIFICATION IS IN THE 
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN OF THE PAR-
TIES. 
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, (1953), 
provides: 
"When a decree of divorce is made the 
court may make such orders in relation to 
the children, property and parties, and the 
maintenance of the parties and children, as 
may be equitable; provided, that if any of 
the children have attained the age of 10 years 
and are of sound mind, such children shall 
have the privilege of selecting the parent to 
which they will attach themselves. Such sub-
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sequent changes or new orders may be made 
by the court with respect to the disposal of 
the children and the distribution of the prop-
erty as shall be reasonable and proper." 
This statutory provision is a clear mandate to 
the trial court authorizing reasonable modifications 
of decrees previously made concerning the custody 
and visiting privileges with respect to the children 
of the parties. The purpose is to do equity between 
the parties and to protect the well-being of the minor 
chilJren. 
Both parties are required to make every reason-
able effort to comply with an existing decree, and 
a failure " ... to comply or to make a reasonable 
effort to comply, is contempt, ... so long as the de-
rree remains in effect." However, if there has been 
a change of circumstances, the proper procedure is 
a petition to modify the decree. Osmus v. Osmus, 
198 P.2d 233, 114 Utah 216, ( 1948). 
The appellant suggests that because the decree 
which the defendant sought the court to review had 
been in effect for a period of approximately nine 
months, that the defendant's petition for modifica-
tion must be viewed with suspicion. It is submitted, 
however, that the petition was not only timely, but 
necessary if defendant was to avoid being in con-
tempt of court, because of Gary's refusal to spend 
six weeks of his summer vacation in California, 
~ts required by the Decree dated August 21, 1964. 
He also had the greater responsibility of consider-
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ing the welfare of the child. A petition was propel'!} 
submitted to the court for the purpose of considei·-
ing the change of circumstances which had occurred 
since the previous decree was entered. Gary, Uw 
eldest of the three children of the parties, was 11 
years old at the time of the hearing on June 29, 
1965, was in the Fifth Grade and had indicated his 
unwillingness to make the six weeks visit to the 
plaintiff's home in California (T. 5, 6, R. 48) as 
required in the Decree dated August 21, 1964 (R. 
40, 41). His father, respondent here, had instruct-
ed him that he was required to make the visit (T. 
5, 6). Gary indicated that if he was forced to make 
the contemplated visit, that he would "run away" 
( T. 6, R. 48) . He had hostile feelings toward Mr. 
Allyn Schroeder, plaintiff's present husband ( T. 5, 
65), and had become involved in a summer program 
in Salt Lake City, in which he was much interested. 
He was very active in the Cub Scout Program, was 
playing on a Little League Baseball Team, and wish-
ed to join the family in a summer activity of swim-
ming instruction (T. 4, R. 48). Additionally some 
emotional antagonism existed between Gary and 
the plaintiff and Gary maintained strong f~elings 
about her ( T. 20). The court undoubtedly felt that 
requiring Gary to spend six weeks of his summer 
vacation in her home would intensify these feelings. 
Plaintiff made no effort to see her son when she 
made an unannounced trip to visit her parents in 
Preston, Idaho, although she passed by Bountiful, 
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Utah, where Gary and defendant live. She did not 
attempt to see Gary because she "thought it would 
upset him" ('T. 4 7, 11). 
Mr. Gene Kartchner, one of Gary's school teach-
ers, who had become "quite well" acquainted with 
him (T. 30), observed that Gary had emotional 
problems and exhibited an antipathy toward girls 
(T. 32). He was of the opinion that the contemplat-
ed visit to California would be an emotional ex-
perience for him (T. 33, 37). 
This court has previously expressed the policy 
of the courts in Utah in cases where the custody of 
children is altered. 
"While the parents are entitled to some 
consideration, the paramount objective in such 
proceedings is not therapy for them, nor vin-
dication of asserted parental rights, but it is 
the welfare of the children. 
* * * 
"Parental love must find expression, to 
some extent at least, in sacrifice for the hap-
piness and welfare of children, rather than in 
merely insisting upon privileges of parent-
hood." Johnson v. Johnson, 7 Utah 2d 263, 
265, 267, 323 P.2d 16 ( 1958). 
Before readjusting the visiting periods of the 
parents, full opportunity was accorded both to pre-
sent evidence concerning the request of the natural 
father to have temporary custody of his two child-
l'en in Utah for two weeks during their summer 
vacation, and to restrict the length of the visit of 
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Gary in California. The August 24, 1964 Decree 
had limited the father's opportunity to visit the two 
younger children, ages 10 and 7, to the home of the 
plaintiff in California. The court also conducted an 
interview with Gary (T. 70). 
Adjusting the rights of natural parents with 
respect to their children, is a difficult responsibility 
and the trial court has properly been accorded con-
siderable discretion in making this judgment. 
~'Due to the equitable nature of such pro-
ceedings, the proper adjudication of which is 
highly dependent upon personal equations 
which the trial court is in an advantaged posi-
tion to appraise, he is allowed considerable 
!attitude of discretion and his orders will not 
be disturbed unless it appears there has been 
a plain abuse thereof." Johnson v. Johnson, 
7 U.2d 263, 267-268, 323 P.2d 16 ( 1958). 
The court properly found there had been a sub-
stantial change in circumstances from the time of 
the previous hearing in August of 1964, to the date 
of the hearing at the end of the school year in 1965. 
Certainly changes, beyond those minimum basic 
changes cited in the Findings of Fact upon :which 
the Decree of July 27, 1965 was based, existed, as 
are shown in the Record. 
Gary was now nearly 12 years old and he had 
developed broader interests. He had completed the 
5th grade and was doing well in school, with above 
average performance, making primarily A's and 
B's (T .. 3). He had become involved in the activi-
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ties of the Cub Scout Program (T. 3). Further, he 
had made the Little League Baseball Team and was 
scheduled to play through the first week in Aug-
ust, 1965 (T. 3, 4). It is understandable that he 
anticipated the possibility of playing in the All 
Star Game ( T. 4). He was also planning to engage 
in swimming instruction during much of the sum-
mer (T. 4). The activities in which he was engaged 
were normal for a boy of his age. It was important 
for him to engage in these activities with his friends 
and to succeed in a program which he had begun. 
When Gary was informed by his father that he was 
to spend six weeks of his summer vacation in Calif-
ornia, beginning the first of July, ''he began cry-
ing" and said he didn't want to go (T. 6). 
During the summer of 1964, the defendant 
took Gary to California to visit plainttiff and the 
two younger children. Although not required to take 
Gary, he did so because he thought he should visit 
with his brother and sister ( T. 9) . Al though de-
fendant took Gary to the plaintiff's home on four 
separate occasions during the two days they were 
there for the purpose of visiting her, she did not 
see him once (T. 9, 10). 
Initially Gary had lived with his mother and 
step-father in California. Gary later told Mr. Schro-
eder in a telephone conversation initiated by Mr. 
Schroeder, to ''leave him alone" and that he 
''wouldn't go anywhere" with him (T. 65). With 
this background it can be understood that Gary had 
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some justification for his feelings of disappointment 
in being required to spend six weeks of his summer 
vacation in a home where he would be unha11py. 
Mrs. Schroeder indicated that she could arrange to 
have Gary attend scout meetings in California (T. 
48). However, to a boy of 12 years, the activity it-
self, without the association of his friends, loses 
much incentive and purpose. Further, Mrs. Schro-
eder was of the opinion that if she had Gary for a 
longer period during the summer that this would 
"help his emotional feelings toward [her] and to-
ward his step-father." (T. 48). Children are plain-
spoken and develop strong feelings. Their affec-
tions and loyalties cannot be transferred with thl1 
apparent ease of some adults. His antagonism to-
ward Mr. Schroeder, had developed over a period of 
time. He had seen his home broken and his mother 
going out on dates with Mr. Schroeder while Mr. 
Jeppson, his father had tried to put a stop to it 
( T. 1964, 71, 72) . He had previously Ii ved with his 
mother in her new home with his step-father. 
A boy of tender years should not be required 
to do a particularly distasteful thing, regardless 
of the consequences to him, if its principal purpost> 
is "therapy" for the parent. 
The plaintiff's own attitude with respect to 
the visiting privileges which had been established 
by the court in August of 1964, is also indicative 
of substantial change. In April, 1965, she with Mr. 
Schroeder and the two younger children, made an 
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unannounced trip to visit her parents in Preston, 
Idaho. vVhen defendant learned that Mrs. Schroeder 
was in Preston, he talked to her at length on the tele-
phone and requested, but was denied, the right to 
speak to his two children ( T. 55) . A portion of that 
testimony follows: 
"Q Do you feel he (Mr. Jeppson) should not 
have the right to speak with these child-
ren or visit with them at this time, under 
the supervision of the Court? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
I don't know. 
As a matter of fact, in this conversation, 
this telephone conversation, he asked you 
to let the children speak with him on the 
telephone when you were up in Preston, 
did he not? 
This is true. He did. 
And you ref used to let them come to the 
phone and speak to him; isn't that right: 
Yes. This was our vacation. 
You have answered my question. You 
refused to let them come to the phone 
and speak with him, didn't you? 
That's right. I did. 
Yes. In fact, you gave the reason they 
were out playing, didn't you? 
That's right. They were. 
Now, when you went to Preston, did you 
go through Bountiful? 
No. 
How did you get to Preston? 
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A \Ve went through the freeway. This isn't 
through Bountiful. 
Q Well, that's near Bountiful, isn't it? 
A Well, you're as familiar with the road as 
I am. But we did not go through Bounti-
f ul. 
Q Did you think it might be important to 
Gary if you had stopped in Bountiful 
and visit with him just a few minutes on 
your way back to California? 
A No. 
Q Did you think it might be important to 
the other children for them to visit with 
Gary for a few minutes in Bountiful, or 
maybe an hour or so, on the way back? 
A I thought it was important if Gary could 
come up there and visit. 
Q Did Mr. Jeppson tell you, in the course 
of the conversation, that you could come 
down and visit with Gary if you wanted 
to? 
A Yes. I believe that was mentioned, after 
he told me that Gary had torn up my 
letters. 
Q And that's the reason he said he thought 
you ought to come down and visit with 
him, because of Gary's attitude towards 
you; isn't that so? 
A No. 
Q Has Mr. Jeppson ever asked you for your 
telephone number in California so he 
could call the children? 
A Yes, he has. 
Q Have you given it to him? 
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A 
Q 
A 
No, I have not. 
So that he could not even call them on 
their birthday if he wanted to; is that 
right? 
I suppose. ( T. 55-57). 
* * * 
"Q How did you come up here today, for 
this trip? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
By car. 
By car? 
that's right. 
Mr. Schroeder drove? 
This is true. 
Did you bring the other children with 
you? 
Yes. 
And would you have any objection to the 
defendant visiting them while you are 
here, under the supervision of the Court? 
I would." (T. 58). 
* * * 
"Q (By Mr. Rex J. Hanson) In other words, 
do you think the father should have the 
right to visit these children privately for 
a few minutes while they're here? 
A If I were sure he wouldn't agitate and 
upset them. 
Q I didn't ask you that. I said, do you think 
he should have the right to visit them 
while they're here, without your being 
there? 
A I wish to abide by the Court decree, 
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which states he can visit them in Calif-
ornia. We don't ask any more from 
Gary." (T. 58-59). 
That portion of the August 1964 decree, limit-
ing defendant's rights to visit the younger children, 
Terry age 10 and Jed age 7, in California only, 
constituted a severe restriction. When this, is coupl-
ed with the fact that Mrs. Schroeder refused to give 
Mr. Jeppson her telephone number so that he might 
visit with them occasionally on the telephone, and 
that she had denied Mr. Jeppson the right to visit 
with them personally or by telephone when in Utah, 
is certainly a substantial change in circumstances 
not contemplated by the earlier decree. As was ob-
served in Johnson vs. Johnson, 7 U.2d 263, 265, 232 
P.2d 216 ( 1958), the paramount objective in a child 
custody proceeding is not "therapy for the parent nor 
vindication of asserted parental right", but is the 
welfare of the children. Certainly it is for the bene-
fit of the children that they have reasonable contact 
with their natural father, and if their mother in-
sists on arbitrarily denying this right, such consti-
tutes a substantial change in circumstances which 
would itself justify the court's order modifying the 
visiting privileges of the natural father. , 
A round trip of some 1400 miles was necessary 
for defendant to visit his children in California and 
plaintiff's suggestion that the defendant, having only 
visited those children in California on two occa-
sions between August 1964, and December 1964, is 
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--
uo imlication of any lack of concern or love for them. 
AL the time of the hearing Terry was ten years old 
and J e<l was seven years old. They were one year 
older than when the Decree of August 1964 was 
entered. This would also entitle the Court to recon-
side1· the limitation placed upon the defendant of 
visiting the children only in California. Further, 
the modified order permits the defendant to visit 
the younger children at his home in Utah for two 
weeks during the summer, and also provides for 
the continuity of that visit as pertains to the child-
ren by requiring Gary to visit his mother in Calif-
ornia for two weeks. This affords an opportunity 
for all of the children to be together for one month 
each summer. Such an arrangement is certainly in 
the best interests of the children even though not 
agreed to by Mrs. Schroeder. The fact that Mr. 
Schroeder, the plaintiff's present husband, has busi-
ness interests in Utah and makes three or four trips 
per year is a new factor the court was entitled to 
consider ( T. 60) . 
At the time the court entered its modified De-
cree on July 27, 1965, a further hearing was set 
fo1· May 24, 1966. It was undoubtedly the court's 
intention to review the matter for the purpose of 
determining if the welfare of the children was being 
best served. In view of the background of this case, 
it is submitted that this was a proper reservation 
(:f the equitable powers of the Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence 
adduced at the hearing was sufficient to support 
the findings of the court that following entry of the 
Decree on August 21, 1964, there had been a sub-
stantial change of circumstances sufficient to jus. 
tify a modification in accordance with the provi-
sions of the decree entered July 27, 1965, and that 
the best interests of the children are served thereby. 
Respectfully submittd, 
HANSON & BALDWIN 
Rex J. Hanson 
Attorney for 
Defendant and Respondent 
909 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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